Iran’s Ayatollahs Are Weaker Than Ever

Iran’s war against Israel took another turn for the worse last week as Operation Rising Lion struck Tehran’s nuclear-weapons program, air defenses and military leadership. Iran’s retaliation has so far been uneven and ineffective. Contrary to the scaremongers, World War III hasn’t broken out, nor will it.

 But what next? The 1979 Islamic Revolution retains power in Tehran, and it could rebuild its nuclear and ballistic-missile programs and terrorist networks. The only lasting foundation for Middle East peace and security is overthrowing the ayatollahs. America’s declared objective should be just that. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made the case last week, telling the Iranian people: “The time has come for you to unite around your flag and your historic legacy by standing up for your freedom from an evil and oppressive regime.”

Despite outward appearances of solid authoritarianism, the regime in Tehran faces widening discontent. The opposition extends across Iran, in the smaller cities and countryside, far beyond Tehran, where the few Western journalists congregate. Iran’s economy has been parlous for decades, and Israeli strikes on oil refineries may weaken it further. Citizen protests in 2018-19 provoked heightened nationwide repression. International antiproliferation and antiterrorism sanctions caused part of the distress, but the fundamental lesson is plain: Never trust your economy to medieval religious fanatics. There is widespread outrage at the corruption and self-enrichment of senior clerics and flag officers (and their families) in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and regular military.

The regime’s imperial projects have done nothing for Iran’s people. They have brought only devastation in Iran itself and elsewhere. Untold billions of dollars were spent over decades to empower terrorist proxies (Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis), to prop up Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and to undertake massive nuclear and missile projects that now lie in ashes.

Click here to read the full article. 

Will Trump TACO on Iran?

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The world is undeniably close to learning whether Iran can yet again out-negotiate and out-last feckless Western politicians and save its nuclear-weapons program.  On June 5, Donald Trump said(https://www.axios.com/2025/06/04/iran-nuclear-deal-trump) Iran was “slow-walking” nuclear negotiations with the United States.  His two-month time limit to the Ayatollah Khamenei has either expired already or soon will(https://www.axios.com/2025/03/19/trump-letter-iran-nuclear-deal).  

The moment of decision is near, but there is no credible evidence which way Trump will go.  Is he prepared to accept Israel using force against Iran’s nuclear program, either acting alone or alongside the United States?  Or will we see another episode of what Wall Street calls the “TACO trade”:  Trump Always Chickens Out?  At this point, not even Trump knows the answer.

He may hope to proclaim he has produced a better nuclear deal than Barrack Obama’s flawed 2015 agreement, but this is a risky domestic gambit.  Trump faces palpable political vulnerability if he agrees to something that looks, in substance, like Obama’s deal, permitting Iran to continue any uranium-enrichment capability, let alone one as large and sophisticated as Tehran has already developed.  Indeed, if Iran were allowed to do so under whatever guise, including an “international consortium,” Trumpian claims of outdoing Obama and actually stopping Tehran’s drive for nuclear weapons will be immediately exposed as false.  

This risk to Trump of appearing to “chicken out” to Iran is just as high even if an agreement is disguised as “interim,” or “time limited” or qualified in any cosmetic way.  A poorly camouflaged deal is so intellectually dishonest that, when inevitably discovered, the political damage to Trump would be  extensive and lasting.  Trump’s “zeal for a deal” has already united congressional Republicanshttps://jewishinsider.com/2025/05/most-congressional-republicans-insist-on-no-enrichment-for-iran/), notably tame on almost every other issue, against allowing Iran any enrichment capabilities.  Trump says repeatedly he doesn’t want to see force used, but he will soon have no choice, given his own framing of the Iran issue, let alone political and military reality.

Middle Eastern oil-producing states are reportedly working  quietly to facilitate a US-Iran deal.  Of course, Gulf Arab states would respond affirmatively if asked whether they prefer seeing Iran’s nuclear-weapons program ended peacefully.  But in real-world terms, they are confronted by a different question.  If they must face the risk of hostilities with Iran, would they prefer to do so before Tehran possesses deliverable nuclear weapons, or after?  Understood fully, there is only one correct answer, unless Gulf Cooperation Council members wish to live in Tehran’s nuclear shadow, or to launch full-scale efforts to achieve nuclear-weapons status, precipitating an arms race in which they start far behind

Unsurprisingly, Arabian Peninsula leaders have indicated their worries that, given Tehran’s bizarre worldview, they might be targets of Iranian retaliation should Israel and/or America attack the nuclear program.  The United States also worries that its deployed forces in the Middle East are possible targets, and that Iran’s support for international terrorists and murder-for-hire criminal efforts might also be expanded.  Israel need not speculate.  Tehran and its terrorist proxies, particularly Hezbollah, will try to strike Israel, in whatever way they can.

But assessing possible Iranian retaliation means more than simply listing measures the ayatollahs can take.  So doing affords all manner of possible threats a level of credibility that only plays into Iran’s hands.  Right now, Iran is in its weakest geostrategic position since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  Its terrorist surrogates Hamans and Hezbollah have been battered, if not yet fully destroyed;  Syria’s Assad regime has fallen;  the Houthis are at least damaged;  and Iran itself has sustained catastrophic losses to ballistic-missile production facilities and some damage to its nuclear program.  

Is a country already in such dire straits really prepared to add as many as four-to-six new enemies, risking the survival of the regime itself, which is already under enormous threat internally and externally?  In short, Iran’s threats sound decidedly hollow.  In any case, American and Gulf Arab interests coincide, arguing for Washington to meld both its defensive and its deterrence strategies against Iran with interested GCC members, and legitimate for Gulf Arabs to be included in US protective measures for military forces in their territories.

Many believe  Israel will not act decisively against Iran’s nuclear program without explicit US approval.  This is incorrect.  As a geographically small nation, like Singapore and most GCC states, Israel knows that nuclear weapons are an existential threat:  just a few nuclear detonations, and there is no more Israel.  Jerusalem acted without Washington’s blessing against Iraq in 2001;  Iran and Syria in 2007;  and against one facility of Tehran’s nuclear-weapons enterprise (never inspected by the IAEA) at the Parchin military base in 2024.  Faced with Iran’s existential threat, Israel will do what it must,  Bibi Netanyahu in particular understands the American saying, “better to ask for forgiveness than for permission.”  And if the Israelis fail to act, they will have only themselves to blame.

This article was first published in The Independant Arabia on June 11, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Trump’s Gaza Dreaming

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Donald Trump’s remarks on the Gaza Strip after his February 4 meeting with Israeli Prime Minster Bibi Netanyahu precipitated enormous controversy and confusion.  They were not idle musings, but written in advance.  Typically, Trump wandered off-script, speculating about using US military force in Gaza, which White House handlers walked back the next day.  Trump himself then promptly walked back the walk-back, insisting he was serious about American control of Gaza, although without force.  (For the record, I have never advocated deploying the US military in Gaza.)

The ensuing furor has obscured the reality that Trump addressed two vastly different issues.  First, and most bizarrely, he asserted that Israel would hand control of Gaza to the US, which would “own” it, and make it “the Riviera of the Middle East.”  Second, and far more important, was Trump’s contention that resettling Gaza’s population in the Strip was the wrong way forward, at least near-term.  This distinction is critical to evaluating Trump’s statements, until changes positions again, perhaps while you read this article.

Trump’s first idea is not going to happen.  It springs from no underlying philosophy, national-security grand strategy, or consistent forward-looking policy.  It derives instead from his first-term pitch to North Korean leader Kim Jung Un that his country’s untouched beaches could become major resort areas.  That did not materialize, but the dream never died.

Wild as it was for North Korea, it is even more so in Gaza.  The aphorism “capital is a coward” is directly applicable.  Because of the ongoing cease-fire/hostage exchange, Hamas is reasserting control in Gaza, suggesting it may not be as debilitated by Israeli military action as initially thought.  In turn, that means Israel will likely resume hostilities, rightly so, when the exchanges end.  Until Gaza is fully secure, capital and labor necessary to build the Middle East’s Riviera, will be few and far between.  “Gaza” itself is an historical accident, reflecting military reality at the end of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, simply a part of the ancient Mediterranean path leading to Egypt.  Standing alone, it is not economically viable as far as the eye can see. 

Trump’s second suggestion about Gaza’s future is not new, having emanated from multiple sources long before his February 4 comments.  If adopted, it would fundamentally, permanently alter the Middle East.  Among other things, it would be the final death knell for the “two-state” solution.  Well before Hamas’s barbaric October 7 attack, the two-state solution had become simply an incantation.  Afterwards, in Israel, it all but disappeared as a serious proposition.  Nonetheless, absent any serious effort to create an alternative, the mantra has remained the default position. 

Those days are over.  The fundamental problem with the putative Palestinian “state” was its artificiality, a legacy of radical Arab leaders like Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nassar;  its lack of any economic basis;  and its susceptibility to terrorist control.  Nonetheless, if the two-state concept is dead, we must find an alternative.  I once proposed a “three-state” solution:  returning Gaza to Egypt, with Israel and Jordan dividing sovereignty over the West Bank.  This approach would safeguard Israeli security while also settling Palestinians in viable economies, with real futures.  

Palestinians, however, have for decades been so abused by the region’s radical, post-colonial ideologies that neither Cairo nor Amman welcomed having potentially subversive populations come under their jurisdictions.  But the palpable difficulty of resolving the Palestinian issue should not lead regional states and concerned outside powers to fall back to reconstructing high-rise refugee camps in Gaza.  So doing, involving enormous costs in clearing the rubble and unexploded ordnance, not to mention eliminating the Hamas tunnel network, and then reconstruction itself, would inevitably lead to another October 7.  That is obviously unacceptable.

There is an alternative, however, namely changing the way Palestinians have been treated for over seven decades.  UNRWA, the UN’s Palestine relief agency, which is functionally an arm of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, should be abolished, and responsibility for Palestinian refugees transferred to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.  In turn, UNHCR should follow its basic humanitarian doctrine, under which refugees are either repatriated to their country of origin, or, if that is not possible, resettled in other countries.  There is nothing forcible about UNHCR resettlement, since both refugees and recipient countries must agree.  But it is also true that, unlike UNRWA, UNHCR refugee camps do not last forever.

This is not to the detriment of Palestinians.  Exactly the opposite.  It means they will receive the same humanitarian treatment as every other refugee population since World War II.  As difficult as switching to the UNHCR model may be, Trump’s comments, the first such by a major world leader, may finally ignite the debate that must occur to find a lasting home for the Gaza Palestinians.

This article was first published in the Daily Telegraph on February 10, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Ignore Trump’s Gaza distraction. Focus on Iran

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s meeting with President Donald Trump, the first post-inaugural White House visit by a foreign leader, could shape the Middle East for generations. Pre-meeting speculation centered on how the leaders would handle the Hamas-Israel war.

Stunningly, Trump’s comments just before and then after his meeting with Netanyahu focused on the U.S. taking control of the Gaza Strip while Gaza’s residents are resettled elsewhere in the Middle East.  There is little point in commenting seriously on this “idea,” which appears to be entirely Trump’s own.

The most important strategic issue in the real Middle East remains Iran’s existential threat to Israel.  Tehran’s ayatollahs can only be delighted if the Trump administration expends any time and effort at all on the Gaza idea rather than addressing their nuclear weapons program. Restoring the “maximum pressure” campaign from Trump’s first term is a sound decision, but still only the beginning of an effective strategy.

Since Hamas’s barbaric Oct. 7, 2023, attack, Israel, with U.S. assistance, has dealt Iran and its “ring of fire” strategy major blows. Hamas and Hezbollah have been decimated but not destroyed. Iran’s ballistic missile production facilities and its sophisticated, Russian-supplied, S-300 air-defense systems have been all but eliminated. Syria’s Iran-friendly Assad regime has fallen, and its S-300 systems and other military assets have been destroyed. Unfortunately, the Houthis in Yemen, West Bank terrorists, and Iranian-controlled Shia militias in Iraq are only wounded, and not severely.

The job is unfinished, but enormous progress has been made to diminish Iran’s overall threat, especially its terrorist surrogates. The existential danger remains: Its nuclear program is essentially intact, with only one location, the Parchin weaponization facility, attacked. Looking ahead, the central issue remains how to destroy Tehran’s nuclear weapons efforts, which threaten not only Israel but also constitute a major proliferation threat to America and the world.

Eliminating this menace is Netanyahu’s real top priority, but it should not be solely Jerusalem’s responsibility. The United States is the only country that can stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological as well as nuclear). For America and Israel, there has never been a better time to do just that, using carefully targeted force against Iran’s nuclear arms facilities.

Accordingly, Israeli-American objectives should be victory against both Iran’s nuclear and terrorist threats. In World War II, Prime Minister Winston Churchill explained to his countrymen why this was the only acceptable outcome: “victory; victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival.”

The real debate is between those advocating victory and those advocating the Obama-Biden approach:  endless negotiations on an elusive deal to return Iran’s government to civilized behavior. There are certainly legitimate questions about the timing of striking Tehran’s nuclear facilities. Most important is reducing Iran’s capacity to retaliate against Israel, friendly Gulf Arab states, and deployed U.S. forces in the region. In Lebanon, Hezbollah likely retains tens of thousands of Iranian-supplied missiles, and Iran itself still has significant numbers of missiles and drones. The clock is running. Tehran is racing to repair the production facilities Israel leveled in October 2024 to replenish its missile stockpiles.

Another mutual priority is achieving Israel’s objective of eliminating the political and military capabilities of Hamas and Hezbollah, as Netanyahu stressed yesterday. Although Israel has enjoyed remarkable success in Gaza and Lebanon, the recent Gaza hostage releases were staged to portray Hamas as a viable fighting force, with considerable support among Gaza’s civilians. Yet under former President Joe Biden’s ceasefire deal, which Trump’s pre-inaugural pressure on Netanyahu ironically brought to fruition, Israeli negotiations with Hamas over Gaza’s future are due to start. Yet this is precisely what Netanyahu wanted to avoid and why Biden failed for seven months to close the deal. Just because it is now Trump’s deal does not improve it substantively.

Hamas can have no part in any future Gaza, whatever it looks like, nor can Hezbollah have any future in Lebanon. Only by removing these cancers can Gazans and Lebanese have any prospect of normality.  And so long as the ayatollahs rule in Tehran, they will do their best to rearm their terrorist proxies, even under “maximum pressure” against Iran.

Following their summit, Netanyahu and Trump must demonstrate the resolve to persevere, as Churchill said, however long and hard the road may be. Watch what happens on Iran.

This article was first published in the Washington Examiner on February 5, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Trump and the Middle East

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History in the Middle East is moving very fast these days.  The long-overdue fall of Syria’s Assad regime is only the latest evidence, and Donald Trump’s January 20 inauguration will accelerate the pace.  The central question is whether the principal players seize opportunities now open for lasting regional peace and security before they quickly close.  Of course, there are massive, daunting uncertainties, but leaders should remember the Roman saying, “fortune favors the bold.”

Surprisingly, one of the major uncertainties could be Trump.  In his first term, he was viewed as automatically pro-Israel, moving the US embassy to Jerusalem and recognizing Israeli sovereignty over disputed territory in the Golan Heights.  It would be wrong for several reasons, however, to assume reflexively that this pattern will recur during his second term.

For example, Trump’s private view of Netanyahu is far more negative than generally perceived, exemplified by Trump’s anger when Netanyahu congratulated Biden on winning the 2020 presidential election(https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-jerusalem-israel-middle-east-iran-nuclear-d141ca03a5e38bfb60b37f94a38ecda8).  To most of the world, this was hardly noteworthy, but Trump’s fixation never to be perceived as a loser forced him to argue that the Democrats stole the election, which mythology Netanyahu violated.  Even before that, Trump said in an interview that he thought the Palestinian Authority’s Mahmoud Abbas wanted peace more than Netanyahu(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lq1seiWI8ro), which hardly expresses confidence in the Israeli leader.  Moreover, Netanyahu is an expert politician, far more astute than Trump, which undoubtedly also inflames Trump’s vanity.

Moreover, Trump’s obsession to seek a deal on anything and everything, even with Iran’s ayatollahs, may come to dominate his Middle East actions.  As I previously recounted in The Room Where It Happened, Trump came remarkably close to meeting Iran’s then-Foreign Minister, Javid Zarif, at the August, 2019, G-7 summit in Biarritz, France.  French President Emmanuel Macron suggested such an encounter to Trump immediately upon his arrival in Biarritz, and he was initially inclined to agree.  Conferring in Trump’s hotel room with Jared Kushner and White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvanery, I urged against meeting with Zarif.  Trump ultimately did not see Zarif, but, as the Duke of Wellington said of Napolean’s defeat at Waterloo, it was “the nearest run thing you ever saw.”

Trump’s pre-Inauguration intervention in Joe Biden’s long effort to obtain a cease-fire/hostage-release deal between Hamas and Israel is also noteworthy.  After seven months of failure, Trump’s pressure on Israel resulted in Netanyahu finally accepting Biden’s deal, or at least its first phase.  Trump wanted to take credit for the hostage releases, hearkening back to the start of Ronald Reagan’s administration, when Iran returned US embassy officials taken hostage during the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  On that level, Trump succeeded where Biden failed.  But whether Trump understands Biden’s plan has other phases is far from certain, as are the prospects that even the first phase will conclude successfully, let alone those that follow.  

Improbably, however, there have been signs, before and after Trump’s Inauguration, that he may believe that the Gaza war has actually ended.  Steve Witkoff, his family friend and now a special Middle East envoy, has stresses that “phase two” of Biden’s deal, which involves further negotiation between Israel and Hamas, should begin promptly.  This can hardly be what Israel expects.  In addition, Witkoff’s Trumpian “zeal for the deal” mentality, and his inexperience, reflected in naïve public comments(https://www.foxnews.com/media/trump-envoy-says-gaza-ceasefire-could-pave-way-mideast-normalization-deal-inflection-point), are factors that could militate against Israel in the immediate future.  Impressed by Witkoff’s performance to date, Trump may have decided to give him a role in Iran matters, although that remains unclear(https://www.axios.com/2025/01/23/trump-witkoff-iran-diplomacy-nuclear-deal).  Nonetheless, both have said they favored diplomatic options to resolve Iran’s nuclear threat.

If true, this creates a dilemma for Netanyahu.  Right now, Israel and America have the best opportunity ever to destroy Iran’s nuclear-weapons and missile programs.  Israel has already massively damaged Iran’s missile-production facilities(https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production) and at least one target involved in weaponizing highly enriched uranium(https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-research-facility), not to mention flattening Iran’s sophisticated, Russia-supplied, S-300 air defense systems(https://www.voanews.com/a/israel-s-attack-on-iran-has-left-tehran-offensively-and-defensively-weaker/7848701.html).  Additional attacks in Syria after Assad’s overthrow have opened an air corridor allowing direct access from Israel to Iran.  The path is clear.  

Obstacles remain, notably Iran’s and Hezbollah’s remaining ballistic missiles, which would enable either retaliatory strikes against Israel, or even a pre-emptive strike to foreclose Netanyahu’s options.  Israel, Jordan, and nearby Arab states must also worry about the current regime in Damascus, led by the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (“HTS”) terrorist group.  Having shed his nom de guerre, and changed from combat fatigues to suits and ties, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa is doing his best to convince outsiders that he now simply seeks responsible government in Syria.  Whether this is true remains unclear, as do Turkish aspirations in Syria and across the region.  The Biden administration(https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/01/24/us-syria-intelligence-hts-isis/) reportedly went so far as to share intelligence with HTS about ISIS, although whether Trump will continue this risky business is unknown.

What is inescapable is that while Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities have never been more vulnerable, Trump’s new administration seemed undecided on its future course.  His first term may not be an accurate prediction of his second.  There is no Trumpian grand strategy at work here since he does not do grand strategy.  Instead, he is transactional, episodic, and ad hoc, often making decisions based on whatever the last person he consults with recommends.  This may be the real future of America’s policy in the Middle East.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on January 28, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Entangling a new president: the Biden team lays traps in the Middle East

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Dr. Dave Wurmser

Transitions of administrations, when passing from one party to the next, are always tricky processes.  There is much change, and there is much effort to avoid change.  From my experience in previous transitions, this is especially true for transitions that pass from a left-leaning government to a conservative-leaning government.  This is true for two reasons. First, the left has as part of its beliefs the institutionalization of power in the government, while the right inherently is more averse to institutionalized government power. As such, the left being far more attentive to the power of embodying ideas and ideologies within institutionalized structures, they are more attentive as those institutions pass to and slip from their executive control. This is especially true of progressives even more so than liberals, since the former is schooled in the ideas of Antonio Gramsci and the “Long March through Institutions” – a primer for socialists and communists on how to take over corporate and governmental institutional structures. Second, the vast majority of the government’s employees identify more with the left than the right. This is especially true as a conservative government that defines itself against the Washington establishment comes into power. As such, every transition, and most likely this one far more than most, if ever, is accompanied by a mad race by those loyal to the ideas of the previous administration to set and lock the new administration into policies anchored in the concepts of the outgoing administration.  

There is a window of opportunity to do this during transition because before the new team can take over, its most senior positions – the ones filled by the most reflective of the new administration’s ideas and trusted by the incoming president – require confirmation and are generally filled only in the weeks after inauguration.  Thus, the unconfirmed personal staff of the president – the National Security Advisor or special assistants – are the only ones on board at the start.  Second, because of security clearance requirements and the fact that an official has no authority to hire employees before he himself holds the position, second tier and deeper down political appointments are slow to be filled – meaning those few aides who are installed in the first days of the president’s term still must rely on staff, bureaucracy and in some cases even the appointees of the previous administration.  Needless to say, an isolated president, with a few lone staffers and no supporting bureaucracy is highly vulnerable to having policies and ideas foisted upon it unwillingly, unwittingly, or even somewhat dishonestly.  I saw this in action myself during the transition in 2001.  Indeed, as late as 2005, one major proliferation/arms control policy issue came up that demanded a fundamental policy reconsideration, but when raised, the bureaucracy refused to allow the issue discussed since, it said, there had already been the final high-level policy decision. When?  In early February 2001 – namely in the first weeks of the new Bush administration before any staff below the cabinet level had come on board, and even some cabinet members were still not confirmed.

Such policy fiats can be set either through finagling major policy statements, forcing decisions by the security cabinet before they have any staff, or it can be done by signing treaties and executing policies by the previous administration in its last days, especially when those policies embody the strategic imagery that is being rejected by the incoming administration.

Avoiding this transition trap relies entirely on the patience and savviness of some of the top staff of the new administration who are in non-confirmation positions – – which means they can take office immediately on 20 January and do not need confirmation. They will help set and monitor the implementation of policy on behalf of the president. But they do not have their own staff, nor are they offered the ones who really have the expertise, and most importantly there isn’t a group of people surrounding them who think like them that can reinforce their new policy outlook. As such some of these early staffers get overwhelmed, manipulated and barreled over into fulfilling the policy set by the previous administration intentionally designed to lock the incoming administration into the strategic concept that had failed before the new offices were taken.

This is likely the situation now with respect to Middle East policy. The new administration advocates a sharp departure not only from the previous administration, but from the common wisdom and consensus of the established foreign policy elites and the ensconced foreign policy bureaucracy. The “America First” policy may be somewhat undefined, but a clear principle is that we treat our friends better than our enemies, and that we do so since we know strong friends who project power both secure American interests and reduce their reliance on the constant investment of American power. In terms of the Middle East, the most marked feature of this is strong support for Israel, and more respect to Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain to protect themselves and defend against those who would challenge them.

The departing administration had the opposite view.  The unapologetic assertion of regional power was seen as provocative and the support for allies had to be tempered by our desire to moderate and integrate (some would describe this as appease) our enemies.  Israeli power was seen to make Israel too secure to be pliable to adopt policies preferred by Washington but rejected locally.  The rising influence of progressivism on the left, moreover, sharpened this hostility to Israeli, Saudi and UAE power and influence.

As such, during a transition, not only are residual staffers from the previous, largely progressive, administration trying to tether a new administration and prevent it from embarking on a new path, but so too are foreign powers, like Qatar, Turkey, and others, who trying desperately to freeze policies in place that were highly advantageous by the previous Biden administration, were aligned with their strategic vision, worked to their benefit.  These foreign powers, thus work aggressively during transition to prevent the proper and smooth construction and application of a new policy that may be favorable to their opponents. Again, this is especially marked in this transition. It is no secret that most of the political appointees now in confirmation to enter the new administration are strongly pro-Israeli, support the Saudi kingdom, and see the world much in the same way that America’s strongest supporters of Israel see it. Their vision is diametrically opposed to the vision of the outgoing administration.

The two core pillars upon which the Biden team rested its strategic outlook in the Middle East were first that Iran can be moderated, integrated and harnessed to provide regional stability, and second that regional instability is primarily driven by the failure to solve the Palestinian problem, which in turn can only be solved by the creation of a Palestinian state within the 1948 armistice lines.  The Abraham Accords were dismissed as a marginal event and not a real peace treaty – let alone strategic bloc forming – because they did nothing to bring about a solution to the Palestinian problem.  Moreover, the solution to the Palestinian conflict was informed in the Biden era by an idea President Obama (much of the Biden team hailed from that administration) himself formulated in a teleconference with the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations a decade ago: Israeli strength reduced Israel’s longing for peace and hardened Israeli will to reject compromise. It also lent Israel a buffer of strength that rendered it more immune to American pressure to impose concessions Israel would otherwise be unwilling to make.

After October 7, this determination to solidify the two pillars of paradigm was actually reinforced in Washington.  Israeli victory and destruction of its enemies akin to the 1967 victory was resisted. Israel’s effort to bear down on all the proxies constituting Iran’s ring of fire were leashed, and Israel’s strikes against Iran itself were capped and diminished.  But at the heart of the State Department’s greatest efforts was the attempt to tap into Israeli vulnerabilities – – such as the hostages – – and desires – – like peace with Saudi Arabia – – and leverage them to impose on Israel strategic weakness and dependency. In Israel’s strategic weakness and dependency, the Biden team hoped to be able to impose on Israel policies that Israel would normally reject as either strategically dangerous or ideologically repulsive. As such, the Biden team tried throughout the war to increase Israeli dependency and vulnerability and prevent a solid Israeli strategic victory.

At the same time, Israel suffered trauma and vulnerability after October 7.  Its world of ideas and paradigms – deterrence, condominium with Palestinians, status quo, slow moderation of the Palestinian political orbit – all crashed. Israeli weakness and pain did not make Israel pliable and dependent as President Biden had theorized a decade earlier but drove Israel into a defensive crouch and war it believed was its second war of Independence – a desperate battle just to survive with little or no latitude for compromise, goodwill or tolerated vulnerability.  Israel was in its own World War II battle of civilizational survival against absolute evil.  As such, the world of the Biden team was the opposite of the world as seen by Israel. 

Clearly the incoming Trump administration subscribes to Israel’s view of the world and the region, not the Biden team’s.  So the effort in this transition of the Biden team is to ensure that policies, agreements and statements are made that lock the new administration into their strategic paradigm, therein derailing and sabotaging the principles of the “America First” agenda, much like UNSC Resolution 2334 of December 23, 2016, attempted to lock the incoming first Trump administration into  its policies rejecting any Israeli legitimacy beyond the 1948 ceasefire lines. 

Enter the various ceasefire agreements now pursued by the Biden administration during transition. 

In its twilight days, the Biden administration has focused its efforts into obtaining a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. But Hamas would settle for nothing less than a full Israeli defeat and a return to the status quo ante of October 6 in terms of a powerful Hamas state ruling over all Gaza with improperly regulated access to resupply its weapons and access to the world through Egypt. Moreover, the aims of Hamas were not altogether opposed to every aspect of US policy, which also sought to prevent a decisive Israeli offensive victory and reoccupation of Gaza.  So to pursue its objective and to secure a ceasefire, the administration leveraged what was at its disposal to prevail over Israel – – namely Israel’s primordial hope to retrieve its hostages, its practical need to obtain arms supplies from the United States, and its diplomatic need to have an American cover internationally. The war, the Biden team hoped, could actually advance the idea that Israel cannot win militarily, must concede to the Palestinians in order to make peace, and that Israeli weakness can successfully impose Israeli malleability, and thus makes more likely peace and the establishment of a Palestinian state. It also makes Israel dependent entirely on the United States for addressing the existentially, threatening Iran nuclear issue and again subjugates Israel to a fiat by Washington on the Palestinian issue accordingly. The cease-fire agreement and the Lebanese cease-fire agreement are both thus anchored fundamentally to that idea. If the United States under the Trump administration adopts and carries through both agreements, and it forces Israel neither to react to violations nor jettison either agreement at critical phases to finish the war that could not be finished under the Biden administration, then essentially the incoming administration perpetuates the world view on the Middle East that embodied the previous administration.

The second trap is peace with Saudi Arabia. The Abraham accords were grounded in the idea that there is such an overarching strategic interest for the UAE, Bahrain and others to align strategically with Israel to face common enemies and to take advantage of the common capabilities of both countries to strongly advance the economies, strategic survival and interests of each. The Abraham Accords were informed already then by the idea of reducing American presence, a strong and robust Israel that is self-confident and independent, and a rejection of the subordination of those relations to the Palestinian issue. Essentially the big innovation was to remove the Palestinian veto over peace with Arab countries and decouple the issue entirely.

The Biden administration through the ceasefire to the Gaza conflict has essentially now welded progress in pursuing an Israeli-Saudi peace to the Palestinian issue. That grants the Palestinians – any Palestinian faction whether Hamas or the PLO — a veto over an Israeli peace treaty with any Arab country: the lowest common denominator Palestinian faction attains thus the ability to derail it. It has attempted to do so since early this year – using Israel’s deep desire for such a peace – and, in fact, ever since it took office in 2001 to shunt it off the main rails into running through the Palestinian track. It forced Palestinian representation and involvement in all the Abraham Accords working groups already in 2022, in effect paralyzing them and making them moribund.  The third phase of the cease-fire – a regional state-building effort to rehabilitate Gaza– is essentially transformed also into the first phase of a peace-process between Israel and Saudi Arabia, so Israel must accept a devastating, life-threatening strategic defeat in Gaza and allow essentially a Palestinian entity run by Hamas and internationally, supported to arise there in order to get to through the third phase and get into the serious process of making peace with Saudi Arabia. This forces Israel, if it wishes to have peace with Saudi Arabia, to strategically suffer a catastrophic defeat in Gaza.

This of course, would amount to a catastrophic sabotage of the new administration. The new Trump team would not only be unable to build a policy anchored to “American First” principles upon which it would most pride itself, but it also would make Israel weak and unable to carry its own burden. Israel would be ever more dependent because of its weakness, which ensures that the United States will not have a strong ally that will share the burden of regional defense in Israel, or in the Saudi Kingdom or among others. Instead, the United States would be forced to invest more in endless support of allies who cannot defend themselves. This is a danger to the United States, a rejection of its stated principles in favor of continuing the Biden administration’s, and represent an existential threat for Israel, Saudi Arabia in the UAE.

But that is precisely the global approach with which the Biden administration is trying to shackle the incoming administration and force it into adopting replete with all of its assumptions, worldviews, and conceptions.

The ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas may be necessary in order to retrieve whatever live hostages Israel is able to repatriate.  Every family in Israel longs for closure and the Israeli state owes that to its bereaved, tortured and terrified citizens.

But it is a vital American interest under advertised “America First” principles to allow Israel to restart the war, and perhaps to enforce unilaterally UNSC Resolution 1701 and 1559 in Lebanon which are embedded in the Lebanon ceasefire.  If Hamas emerges with a story of victory in any form, not only will Israel soon face another October 7, replete with a global explosion of antisemitism, but so too will the global Jihadi effort feel its oats with the steroid of perceived success – a ghoul which will raise its head not only in the Middle East, but in cities and towns all over the West.  

We already see it.  A new, dangerous narrative is emerging regionally. Prominent Syrian Islamists aligned with the new Syrian government, now argue that Syria’s Baathist regime fell not because Israel had annihilated the Hizballah/IRGC security infrastructure and substructure of Syria’s regime, leaving it unable to even mount a minimal defense of itself, but because the momentum of the great “victory” of Oct 7 “Al-Aqsa flood” had translated into a regional tide that swept out Assad and ushered in the beginning of a new Islamist era that will liberate Jerusalem, destroy the “Zionists,” and defeat the West.  As long as Hamas rules Gaza and argues it survived, and thus won, the war, this view will grow as a cancer that will haunt Israel, Europe and America.

Israel must be allowed – for our sake as much as their own — to abandon the ceasefire agreement when the last hostage it can hope to still retrieve has been liberated and finish the war in a way that results in a cataclysmic victory. It must be allowed to complete a devasting defeat of regional radical threats and deflate global Jihadi confidence and momentum.

1https://x.com/hahussain/status/1880279055003459876?s=43&mx=2



Trump can turn Syria opportunity against Iran

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Last month’s rapid collapse and fall of Syria’s Assad dynasty surprised the world, starting with Bashar Assad himself. Led by the radical Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al Sham and likely galvanized by Israel’s mauling of Hamas and Hezbollah, the rebel victory represents Iran’s third catastrophic defeat in trying to implement its anti-Israel “ring of fire” strategy.

HTS and its leader, Ahmed al Sharaa, are struggling to consolidate power within long-fractured Syria. Their main priority is convincing Arab and Western states that they are no longer terrorists, nor controlled by Turkey, which labels HTS as terrorist but has nonetheless aided it for years. Sharaa has shed his terrorist nom de guerre and even his combat fatigues, now appearing at media events in Western attire. Whether his transformation from radical terrorist is real or merely cosmetic remains to be seen.

Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei attends a program at the Imam Khomeini Hosseini meets with Iran Air Force commanders and Iran Air Defense Force officers at the Imam Khomeini Husayniyya in Tehran, Iran on February 05, 2024. (Iranian Leader Press Office / Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images)

Still, this is no time for the United States to say “hands off.” We have two critical national security interests flowing from Assad’s downfall. First, cooperating with Israel and Arab allies, we must ensure that Syria does not become another terrorist state, threatening our regional allies and possibly Europe and America. Second, Washington and Jerusalem should seize the opportunity of swiftly moving events in the Middle East to increase pressure on Iran, including destroying or substantially weakening its nuclear weapons program.

On the antiterrorism front alone, the U.S. has compelling reasons to prevent another Afghanistan. Nearly 2,000 of our troops remain in northeastern and eastern Syria, supporting primarily Kurdish forces who helped eliminate the Islamic State territorial caliphate in 2019, and who are now guarding thousands of dangerous Islamic State fighters held prisoner. The Kurds are threatened not only by HTS but by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s neo-Ottomanist aspirations, long-standing irredentist objectives in northern Syria, and his vindictive campaign against the Kurdish people. Northeastern Syria is today relatively calm. Any U.S. withdrawal or assent to Turkish demands to “relieve” us would only contribute to longer-term instability.

Inside the remainder of Syria, numerous ethnic and religious minorities, some favored under Assad, some not, worry about their fate under radical Sunni Islamist rule, as possibly dangerous as the Shia Hezbollah terrorists in next-door Lebanon. The disorder in Syria compounds the already widespread fragmentation created during the Arab Spring struggle to overthrow Assad. These anarchic conditions are conducive for existing and newly arriving foreign terrorists to establish a significant presence in Syria, as in Afghanistan, which would pose substantial dangers regionally and globally.

For Washington, the possibility that HTS might push Russia out of its naval and air stations at Tartus and Hmeimim, respectively, is a major upside. HTS has reportedly called for all Russian forces to withdraw. Widespread reporting indicates that some removals of troops and equipment are underway, perhaps slowed by the sinking of a Russian cargo ship in the Mediterranean, which Moscow blames on terrorism. But if HTS did, in fact, expel the Russian military from Syria, that could be promising evidence that HTS wanted to foster stability and reject adventurism by unhelpful foreign assistance.

As to Iran, Assad’s overthrow substantially damaged its hegemonic ambitions, and not just in Syria. By cutting off land supply routes to Hezbollah in Lebanon, HTS severed the most efficient, economical route used by Tehran for years to supply its terrorist proxy. HTS has warned Iran against “spreading chaos in Syria,” which, typically, Iran denied doing.

Israel wasted little time after Assad fled to Moscow, attacking Syrian air, land, and naval military facilities; chemical and biological weapons targets; and temporarily occupying the entire U.N. Golan Heights demilitarized zone and some additional Syrian territory. Although criticized pro forma by Gulf Arab states, Israel’s preventive action was justified by Syria’s instability and the risk of terrorists seizing government control in Damascus. Even the Biden administration acted militarily, bombing significant Islamic State targets to prevent its resurgence, or allowing HTS to absorb Islamic State fighters and assets.

With Syrian air defenses degraded, as Iran’s have been by prior Israeli strikes, the way is now largely open from Israel to Iran should Jerusalem and Washington decide to strike the heart of Tehran’s nuclear program. There may never be a better opportunity.

The Biden administration has consistently and erroneously pressured Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to eliminate Iran’s nuclear menace. However, core U.S. national security interests, notably our long struggles against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism, all justify eliminating Tehran’s existing capabilities. Diplomacy has manifestly failed.

History is ready for the making in Syria and the Middle East. The incoming Trump administration should go for it.

This article was first published in the Washington Examiner on January 6, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

The Fall of Assad

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History is moving fast in the Middle East, raising the possibility, for well or ill, of massive changes throughout the region.  The collapse of Syria’s Assad-family dictatorship took everyone by surprise, starting with Bashar al-Assad himself, and certainly including Russia and Iran.  Arab and Western intelligence services missed the regime’s vulnerability, particularly the weakness and disloyalty of its military and security services.  

The brutal dictatorship is gone, but what comes next?  Most importantly, Assad’s removal is yet another massive defeat for Iran’s ruling mullahs.  Following Israel’s thrashing of Hezbollah and its near-total dismemberment of Hamas, this is the third major catastrophe for Tehran’s anti-Israel “ring-of-fire” strategy.  While Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu agreed to a cease fire with Hezbollah, he has made clear it lasts for only sixty days, ending just after the Joe Biden leaves office.  Hezbollah will be in further dire trouble if its overland supply route through Iraq and Syria is permanently blocked.  There is no cease fire with Hamas, meaning both terrorist proxies  could face further Israeli decimation.

As for Iran itself, the situation could hardly be worse.  With three major pillars of its regional power already fallen or on the way, the ayatollahs are now at great risk both internationally and domestically.  Recriminations and finger-pointing among top leaders of the Revolutionary Guards and regular Iranian military(https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/12/09/iran-armed-forces-at-war-with-themselves-fall-assad-syria/) has already spread widely in the general population(https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/13/world/middleeast/iran-syria-assad.html).

Disarray and fragmentation in the senior ranks of authoritarian governments are often the first signs of regime collapse.  Popular discontent in Iran was already extensive due to long-standing economic decline, the opposition of young people and women generally, ethnic discontent, and more.  If the Revolutionary Guard and regular military leaderships begin to come apart, the potential for internal armed conflict grows.  Assad’s collapse showed that a façade of strength can mask underlying weakness, with surprisingly swift collapse following.  

Externally, Iran’s regime has not been this vulnerable since the 1979 revolution.  Jerusalem has already eliminated Tehran’s Russian-supplied S-300 air-defense systems, seriously damaged its ballistic-missile capabilities, and destroyed elements of the nuclear-weapons program(https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-research-facility).  Netanyahu has never had a better opportunity to obliterate all or vast swathes of the entire nuclear effort.  So doing would make Israel, neighboring states, and the entire world safe from the threat of Iran’s decades-long nuclear-proliferation threat, which has long contravened the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Israel, with US assistance if requested, should go for the win on the nuclear issue.  Not only would that eliminate Tehran’s threat of a nuclear Holocaust, it would simultaneously strike yet another domestic political blow against the mullahs.  In addition to the tens of billions of dollars wasted in supporting Iran’s now-decimated terrorist proxies, but the billions spent on nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles would also be seen as squandered.  Iran’s citizens would be perfectly entitled to conclude that the ayatollahs had never had their best interests at heart, and that their removal was now fully justified.

Russia is the next biggest loser.  Distracted and overburdened by its unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, now about to enter its third year, the Kremlin lacked the resources to save its puppet in Damascus.  Vladimir Putin’s humiliation is reverberating globally, and it will also have corrosive impact inside Russia, perhaps finally stimulating more-effective opposition to the ongoing burdens the Ukraine war imposes on Russia’s citizens and  economy.  

Even more significant losses may be coming.  The Kremlin’s main interests in Syria are its Tartus naval station and its Latakia air base.  These are Moscow’s only military facilities outside the territory of the former Soviet Union.  They are vital to Russia’s position in the eastern Mediterranean.  If forced to evacuate these bases, Moscow’s ability to project power beyond the Black Sea would be dramatically reduced, as would be the threat to NATO across the Mediterranean.  Although there were early indications Russia might to retain the bases, recent commercial overhead photography indicates it may be preparing to withdraw some or all of its forces.  The situation remains fluid(https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/12/13/world/syria-news).

Without doubt, Turkey, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) terrorists, and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army are the big winners so far.  However, Syria’s internal situation is far from settled.  American troops remain in northeastern Syria assisting the largely Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces in the anti-ISIS campaign, and at al-Tanf.  The Kurds should not be abandoned, especially to President Recep Erdogan’s neo-Ottomanist aspirations to expand Ankara’s control and influence in Arab lands  It would be a mistake, at this point, to remove HTS from Washington’s list of foreign terrorist organizations, although, unwisely, the Biden administration is reportedly considering doing so(https://www.politico.com/news/2024/12/09/us-debates-lifting-terror-designation-for-main-syrian-rebel-group-00193367).  

While eliminating Assad is a critical contribution to reducing the Iranian threat, neither Israel nor neighboring Arab governments nor the United States have any interest in seeing another terrorist state arise, and this one on the Mediterranean.  Delicate diplomacy lies ahead.  In the meantime, Biden was right to bomb ISIS weapons storage depots in eastern Syria to deny those assets to HTS, and Israel is justified in eliminating the Assad government’s military assets for the same reason.

Importantly for the region and beyond, urgent efforts are required to locate and secure all aspects of Assad’s chemical and biological weapons programs(https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/12/12/syria-chemical-weapons-search-mustard-sarin/).  Assaad used chemical weapons against his own people as recently as 2017 and 2018, so there is no question whether these capabilities exist.

Thus, while there is considerable good news surrounding Assad’s ouster and exile to Moscow, circumstances in Syria still pose serious threats to peace and security in the Middle East and globally.  This is no time to relax or turn away, especially for the incoming Trump administration.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on December 17, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

Dark days lie ahead with Trump on the world stage once more

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Soon to be cast adrift by President-elect Trump, Ukraine’s likely future is bleak. Let’s not make it worse by a feckless peace deal
Donald Trump’s looming inauguration bodes poorly for vital Western security interests, and Ukraine in particular. Trump’s hostility to NATO is palpable, and his feelings about Ukraine follow close behind. After January 20, US military and economic assistance will likely drop significantly, and negotiations with Russia begin quickly. In turn, European financial support for Ukraine will diminish, as EU members rush to revive now-defunct commercial ties with Moscow. Despite contrary press reports, Trump has not yet spoken to Vladimir Putin. When they do, Trump’s desire to put this “Biden war” behind him could, at worst, mean capitulation to maximalist Russian demands. After all, if assisting Ukraine’s defence against unprovoked aggression is unimportant to Washington, why worry about Kyiv’s terms of surrender?

In fact, core America national interests remain. Since 1945, European peace and stability have been vital to advancing US economic and political security. The ripple effects of perceived American and NATO failure in Europe’s centre will embolden Beijing to act aggressively toward Taiwan and the East China Sea; the South China Sea; and along its land borders. These aren’t abstract, diaphanous worries at the periphery of our interests, but hard threats to US physical security, trade, travel and communications globally.

Biden put these interests at risk by bungling implementation of nearly three years of aid to Kyiv. He never developed a winning strategy. His administration helped create the current battlefield gridlock, deterred by constant but idle Kremlin threats of a “wider war.” Parcelling out weapons only after long public debates prevented their most effective use. Biden failed to explain clearly Russia’s threat to key Western interests, thereby fanning the belief there are no such interests, and abetting the Trump-inspired isolationism spreading nationally.

What to do? Aiding Ukraine is in NATO’s vital interest. That interest does not diminish because of persistent Biden administration poor performance. Do we ignore the continuing reality that Russia’s aggression threatens Alliance security? Does Ukraine simply give way to Trumpian capitulationism?

Certainly not. In the coming negotiations, certain points are essential to any potential agreement. The following suggestions, which are hardly my preferred outcome, are the absolute minimum we must obtain. They are only indicative, not exhaustive, and certainly not NATO’s opening position.

Any agreement must be explicitly provisional to keep Ukraine’s future open. Moscow will treat any deal that way regardless. For the Kremlin, nothing is permanent until its empire is fully restored, by their lights. Putin needs time to restore Russia’s military capabilities, and believing any “commitment” to forswear future aggression against Ukraine is dreaming.

A ceasefire along existing military frontlines during negotiations may be inevitable. Nonetheless, we should insist that any ultimate agreement explicitly state that the lines eventually drawn have no political import whatever, but merely reflect existing military dispositions. Russia may later disregard such disclaimers, but such claims must be rendered clearly invalid in advance.

Similarly, the agreement should not create demilitarised zones between Ukrainian and Russian forces inside Ukraine, or along the two countries’ formal border elsewhere. The surest way for a ceasefire line to become a permanent border is to make it half-a-mile wide, extending endlessly through contested territory. A DMZ inures solely to Moscow’s benefit.

Deployments of UN peacekeepers have an unhappy history of freezing the status quo, not helping to resolve the underlying conflict. Consider the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which has partitioned the island since 1964. The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has patrolled the Golan Heights since 1974, and may last forever, but did not prevent Israel from annexing the Golan. The list goes on. In Ukraine, a disengagement force could mean permanent cession of twenty percent of Ukraine to Russia.

The problem is not mitigated if the peacekeepers are under NATO rather than UN auspices. It is not the quality of the military that makes a difference, but the intentions of the parties to the conflict. Does anyone doubt what Russia’s long-term aims are? Or Ukraine’s for that matter? My guess is that the Kremlin won’t agree to NATO peacekeepers anyway, at least not unless augmented by thousands of North Korean troops.

Finally, Ukraine should not be constrained in its future options to join or cooperate with NATO. What’s left of Ukraine will still be a sovereign country, striving for representative government, and free to pick its allies on its own. We should not acquiesce in enforced neutralisation, what in the Cold War was called “Finlandisation”. Even Finland turned out not to like it, finally joining NATO in 2023. And if some hardy nations want to provide security guarantees to Free Ukraine, they should be able to do so, not subject to Russian vetoes.

Soon to be cast adrift by President-elect Trump, Ukraine’s likely future is bleak. Let’s not make it worse by a feckless peace deal.

This article was first published in The Telegraph on November 30, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

Trump and Iran

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Donald Trump’s election as President guarantees that America’s Middle East policy will change.  The real question, though, and a major early test for Trump, is whether it will change enough.  Does he understand that the region’s geopolitics differ dramatically from when he left office, and could change even more before Inauguration Day?  The early signs are not promising that Trump grasps either the new strategic opportunities or threats Washington and its allies face.

The region’s central crisis on January 20 will be Iran’s ongoing “ring of fire” strategy against Israel.  Right now, Israel is systematically dismantling Hamas’s political leadership, military capabilities, and underground Gaza fortress.  Israel is similarly dismembering Hezbollah in Lebanon:  its leadership annihilated, its enormous missile arsenal steadily decimated, and its hiding places shattered.  Israel will continue degrading Hamas, Hezbollah, and West Bank terrorists, ultimately eliminating these pillars of Iranian power.  Even President Biden’s team has already urged Qatar to expel Hamas’s leaders(https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/08/politics/qatar-hamas-doha-us-request/index.html).

Unfortunately, Yemen’s Houthis, still blocking the Suez Canal-Red Sea passage, have suffered only limited damage, as have Iran’s Shia militia proxies in Syria and Iraq.  Iran itself finally faced measurable retaliation on October 26, as Israel eliminated the Russian-supplied S-300 air defenses and inflicted substantial damage on missile-production facilities.  Nonetheless, Iran’s direct losses remain minimal.  Due to intense White House pressure and the impending US elections, Jerusalem targeted neither Tehran’s nuclear-weapons program nor its oil infrastructure.

Whether Israel takes further significant action before January 20 is the biggest unknown variable.  Israel’s October 26 air strikes have prompted unceasing boasting from Tehran that it will retaliate in turn.  These boasts remain unfulfilled.  The ayatollahs appear so fearful of Israel’s military capabilities that they hope the world’s attentions drift away as Iran backs down in the face of Israel’s threat.  If, however, Iran does summon the will to retaliate, it is nearly certain this time that Israel’s counterstrike will be devastating, especially if during the US presidential transition.  Israeli Defense Forces could lay waste to Iran’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs so extensively they rock the foundations of the ayatollahs’ regime.

Washington’s conventional wisdom is that Trump will return to “maximum pressure” economically against Iran through more and better-enforced sanctions, and stronger, more consistent support for Israel, as during his first term.  If so, Tehran’s mullahs can relax.  Trump’s earlier “maximum pressure” policy was nothing of the sort.  Even worse, a Trump surrogate has already announced that the incoming administration will have “no interest in regime change in Iran(https://www.timesofisrael.com/ex-envoy-says-trump-aims-to-weaken-iran-deal-of-the-century-likely-back-on-table/),” implying that the fantasy still lives that Trump could reach a comprehensive deal with Tehran in his second term.

Moreover, despite the staged good will in Bibi Netanyahu’s call to Trump last week, their personal relationship is tense.  Trump said in 2021, “the first person that congratulated [Biden] was Bibi Netanyahu, the man that I did more for than any other person I dealt with.  Bibi could have stayed quiet. He has made a terrible mistake(https://www.axios.com/2021/12/10/trump-netanyahu-disloyalty-fuck-him).”  In practice, this means that Israel should not expect the level of Trump support it received previously.  And, because Trump is constitutionally barred from seeking a third term, he need not fear negative domestic political reactions if he opposes Israel on important issues.

Much depends on the currently unclear circumstances Trump will face on January 20.  In addition to shunning regime change, Trump seems mainly interested in simply ending the conflict promptly, apparently without regard to how(https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-erratic-foreign-policy-meet-a-world-fire-2024-11-06/), which has proven very effective in US politics.  This approach is consistent with his position on Ukraine.  Asserting that neither conflict would have even occurred had he remained President, which is neither provable nor disprovable, Trump sees these wars as unwanted legacies from Biden.

If Israel does not demolish Iran’s nuclear aspirations before Trump’s inauguration, those aspirations will be the first and most pressing issue he faces.  If he simply defaults back to “maximum pressure” through sanctions, he is again merely postponing an ultimate reckoning with Iran.  Even restoring the sanctions to the levels prevailing when Trump left the Oval Office will be difficult, because Biden’s flawed and ineffective sanctions-enforcement efforts have weakened compliance globally.  Trump will not likely have the attention span or the resolve to toughen sanctions back to meaningful levels.  The growing cooperation among Russia, China and Iran means Iran’s partners will do all they can to break the West’s sanctions, as they are breaking the West’s Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia.

As they say in Texas, Trump is typically “all hat and no cattle”:  he talks tough but doesn’t follow through on his rhetoric.  Since he has never shown any inclination to move decisively against Iran’s nuclear program, that leaves the decision to Israel, which has its own complex domestic political problems to resolve.  An alternative is to assist Iran’s people to overthrow Tehran’s hated regime.  Here, too, however, Trump has shown little interest, thereby missing rare opportunities that Iran’s citizens could seize with a minimum of outside assistance.  If Tehran’s ayatollahs are smart, they will dangle endless opportunities for Trump to negotiate, hoping to distract him from more serious, permanent remedies to the threats the ayatollahs themselves are posing.

Of all the critical early tests Trump will face, the Middle East tops the list.  China, Russia, and other American adversaries will be watching just as closely as countries in the Middle East, since the ramifications of Trump’s decisions will be far-reaching.

This article was first published in The Independent Arabie on November 10, 2024. Click here to read the original article.