Trump’s utterly incoherent Ukraine strategy

August 26, 2025

Donald Trump’s Ukraine policy today is no more coherent than it was last Friday when his administration executed search warrants against my home and office. Collapsing in confusion, haste, and the absence of any discernible meeting of the minds among Ukraine, Russia, several European countries, and America, Trump’s negotiations may be in their last throes(https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/08/23/trump-ukraine-frustration/), along with his Nobel Peace Prize campaign.

The administration has tried to camouflage its disarray behind social-media posts, such as Trump comparing his finger-pointing at Vladimir Putin to then-Vice President Richard Nixon during the famous kitchen debate with Nikita Khrushchev. Why Trump wants to be compared to the only President who resigned in disgrace is unclear. Trump also asserted Ukraine can only win by attacking inside Russia(https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-truth-social-ukraine-russia-a545b8a3?mod=article_inline), even as his own Pentagon blocked Kyiv from missile strikes doing just that(https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-has-quietly-blocked-ukraines-long-range-missile-strikes-on-russia-432a12e1), reversing the Biden administration. Russia’s attack on a US-owned factory in Ukraine, which Moscow hasn’t acknowledged, only highlighted the disarray(https://www.nbcnews.com/world/europe/kremlin-casts-doubt-trumps-push-ukraine-peace-rifts-remain-unresolved-rcna226742).

Russia’s unprovoked 2022 aggression against Ukraine is painfully straightforward, and the views of the combatants are completely contradictory. Kyiv believes it is fighting for its freedom and independence, while Moscow seeks to recreate the old Russian Empire, positions which leave no middle ground. They may ultimately agree to a ceasefire, but the threat of renewed hostilities will continue as long as the Kremlin maintains its imperialist goals. Trump has called the conflict “senseless” and “ridiculous,” but Kyiv and Moscow, for widely varying but strongly held reasons, vehemently disagree.

Trump’s furious pace trying to move an extraordinarily complex conflict to resolution over the past two weeks was one of several significant mistakes. So doing inevitably made reaching agreement even on a ceasefire, let alone a full-scale peace agreement, more difficult. US envoy Steve Witkoff met with Vladimir Putin in Moscow on August 8, and immediately returned to Washington to inform Trump, among other things, that Putin wished to meet with him. Two days later, Trump announced the requested summit (soon thereafter revealed to be held in Alaska) would occur one week later, August 15. Trump noted that he wished the meeting could have been held even sooner, but it is almost surely unprecedented in modern history that a summit between leaders of two major powers on such a contentious issue has been arranged so expeditiously. After the Putin-Trump meeting, Trump executed a stunning about-face. He said that, despite his pre-summit threats that sanctions would be imposed on Russia if Putin did not agree to a cease fire, he there would be no new US sanctions or tariffs. Moreover, Trump announced he no longer favored a near-term ceasefire, but wanted instead to proceed directly to a final agreement. Moscow and other capitals could hardly miss these U-turns.

Trump’s subsequent August 18 meetings in Washington with Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky and several European leaders also occurred with dizzying speed. Emerging from that meeting, interrupted by a forty-minute Trump phone call to Putin, came the idea of a soon-to-follow bilateral meeting between Putin and Zelensky, perhaps joined at its conclusion by Trump, or with a follow-up trilateral meeting, presumably at which the three leaders would wrap up a final deal. None of this was realistic, and now appears unlikely any time soon,

A corollary mistake was the very high level of generality at which the major substantive issues were discussed. National leaders often converse together in broad terms, but almost always after their subordinates have plowed through the same ground in much greater detail prior thereto. Inevitably, this more-traditional “bottoms up” process takes longer than the pace Trump wanted. Speaking in broad generalities may seem to enhance chances of reaching agreement, but they may instead merely paper-over vast differences, potentially serious enough to derail discussions entirely. We are not necessarily at that point, but today there is no clear path ahead.

Finally, other bilateral relationships have suffered considerable damage because of the fallout from the administration’s failing diplomacy. India in particular feels deeply aggrieved by Trump. It is the only victim of his threat to impose tariffs and sanctions, either directly on Russia or secondarily on countries purchasing Russian oil and gas. Moscow has not been sanctioned in any way, essentially ignoring White House threats. China, a considerably larger purchaser of hydrocarbons from Russia than India, also remains untouched, as Beijing-Washington trade negotiations continue. By contrast, India has not only been subject to the comparatively high level of “regular” Trump tariffs of 25%, but also hit with another 25% tariff level because of its oil and gas trade with Russia. The longer India hangs out to dry, the worse the New Delhi-Washington relationship gets.

Of course, it’s never over until it’s over, especially with Trump. But his efforts over the last two-plus weeks may have left us further from both peace and a just settlement for Ukraine than before.

This article was originally published by Washington Examiner, on August 26, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

A Bad Summit’s Silver Lining

August 21, 2025

Vladimir Putin led Russia out of international isolation on Friday, striding down a red carpet to greet an applauding Donald Trump. He accepted a ride with President Trump in “the Beast,” and one-on-one applied his KGB training to restart one of Moscow’s most effective influence operations ever. After the Alaska summit, Mr. Putin could legitimately say, as generations of victorious generals have, “The day is ours.”

Since his first encounter with Kim Jong Un, Mr. Trump has argued that U.S. presidents lose nothing by meeting rogue foreign leaders without previously exacting a price. Most everyone else disagrees, especially the rogues. Friday’s summit should clear up Mr. Trump’s misapprehension. Mr. Putin emerged from diplomatic purdah with flags unfurled, literally. How long before Europeans like France’s ever-opportunistic Emmanuel Macron phone Mr. Putin or visit him in Moscow? And how does India, under sanctions from Washington for buying Russian oil, feel about still hanging out to dry?

At the summit’s concluding media event, the leaders were addressing multiple audiences: America, Russia, Ukraine, Europe and, never forget, China. Worried about all these audiences, the White House worked assiduously beforehand to lower expectations. Among Americans, only MAGA loyalists could assert their leader had a good day. Russians seemed exuberant, and in Kyiv and other European capitals the mood was disquiet or dismay. Xi Jinping may now be more inclined to meet with Mr. Trump, having noted his evident fatigue during the press conference.

We don’t know whether the economic teams—Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and their Russian counterparts—took advantage of their free time to confer. From Moscow’s perspective, it was a real opportunity. Even if these ministers reached no conclusions, they could have laid the basis for future discussions between Messrs. Trump and Putin, or at least arranged for their own subordinates to prepare the way.

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Trump is deluded if he thinks his meeting with Putin is cause for celebration

August 12, 2025

Friday’s Alaska summit between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin is not shaping up well for Ukraine. Every indication is that Trump believes he and his (once again) good friend Putin will conjure some land swaps and bring peace.

Of course, the land in question will be bits and pieces of Ukraine’s territory, not Russia’s, with Moscow probably ending this war controlling 20 per cent of Ukraine. If anyone needed proof that Trump acts in international affairs not like a strategist but like a free electron, this past week settles the matter.

Before the Alaska summit even begins, Putin has scored a major propaganda victory. An international pariah, leading a rogue state guilty of unprovoked aggression against its neighbour, is landing on American soil for pictures standing next to the president of the United States.

Trump has tariffed the entire world for the privilege of doing business in America, but asked and received exactly nothing from Putin. Inviting him to Alaska is not quite as offensive as inviting the Taliban to Camp David in 2019 to discuss the Afghanistan war, but it comes close. Most ironically, Alaska is former Russian America, purchased (thank God) by Washington in 1867, which some Russian ideologues wish to reclaim.

Putin almost certainly concluded from Trump’s recent pro-Ukrainian behaviour, such as allowing Patriot air-defence systems to be transferred indirectly to Kyiv, that he had pushed his “friendship” with Trump too far. With the August 8 deadline to have a Ukraine-Russia ceasefire looming, Putin was doubtless considering how to repair the damage and reel Trump back into line when Trump’s envoy-for-everything Steve Witkoff sought a Moscow meeting. We don’t know when Putin decided to propose a US-Russia summit, but that idea was certainly conveyed to Witkoff to bring back to Trump.

As before, Putin clearly hopes to work his KGB training on Trump, making the president his unwitting tool. Perhaps, Putin reasoned, he might even avoid pain for missing the August 8 deadline. He knew the lure of being the centre of massive press attention is a fatal attraction for Trump, who was almost instantaneously ready for a summit. Indeed, just before announcing that August 15 was the time and Alaska the place, Trump said he wished the summit could have been earlier.

Putin not only got his meeting, but TACO (“Trump always chickens out”) worked again; August 8 came and went with no new tariffs or sanctions imposed on Moscow, or China, the largest purchaser of Russian oil and gas. Only India was left in the lurch, facing a doubling of its Trump tariff rate to 50 per cent for purchasing Russian hydrocarbons.

The Alaska summit recalls Helsinki in 2018, when Trump sided with Putin’s denial of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential campaign, contrary to what America’s intelligence community concluded. Putin is doubtless looking for something analogous. Moscow has already achieved another success by ensuring that no pesky Europeans, especially Ukrainians, would be invited to Alaska, reminiscent of the Trump-Zelensky meeting at Pope Benedict’s funeral, where Trump all but pushed French President Macron out of the picture. While Trump simply enjoys getting more attention, the one-on-one format provides exactly the kind of playing field Putin needs.

Moreover, the Alaska meeting afforded Russia a first-mover advantage, which it seized immediately. Within 48 hours of Witkoff’s Moscow trip, the two sides built on earlier outlines of what Russia would deem an acceptable solution. Press reports indicated that Russia’s terms, which seemed acceptable to Trump, resembled vice presidential candidate J D Vance’s proposal in September, 2024: Russia would essentially keep Ukrainian lands it had conquered; an undefined peacekeeping force would police the current front lines; and Ukraine would be barred from joining Nato. As observers noted, Vance’s plan looked like Russia’s.

Seemingly, therefore, Trump and Putin are preparing to present Zelensky with a fait accompli after meeting in Alaska. Trump said on Friday that Zelensky would have to remove Ukraine’s constitutional prohibitions against ceding territory to another country, which is exactly what Trump is expecting to come. Thus, even before the summit, Putin exploited his first-mover advantage by bringing Trump back to his side.

With this disturbing prospect now explicit, Zelensky, in his first public response to news of the Alaska summit, rejected any surrender of Ukrainian lands. Zelensky’s response is fully justified and hardly surprising, but it plays into Putin’s hands: Russia, he will say, took the lead in seeking peace, and Ukraine is the obstructionist. While we are not yet back to the disastrous February 28 Oval Office encounter between Zelensky and Trump, Putin would obviously like to reprise Trump telling Zelensky “you don’t have the cards right now”.

As of today, Putin again has diplomatic momentum, and Zelensky is on the defensive. Time for the UK and Europe’s other Ukraine supporters to step in before it’s too late.

This article was first published in the Daily Telegraph on August 11, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Starmer’s turn against Israel will prolong war

May 26, 2025

Removing the ayatollahs in Iran is the only route to securing longterm peace in Gaza

Israel is now grappling with possibly the last phases of eliminating the Hamas terrorist threat. Instead of support from a unified West determined to extirpate terrorism, however, Jerusalem is under attack for attempting exactly that. Prime Minister Keir Starmer said he was “horrified” by Israel’s recent “escalation”. Foreign Secretary David Lammy condemned the “dark new phase in this conflict,” suspended trade negotiations with Israel, and said it should agree to a cease-fire to free remaining hostages, as if that were Jerusalem’s only legitimate objective.

Last week, a gunman in Washington brutally murdered two Israeli embassy employees, chanting “free, free Palestine” while being arrested. Thereafter, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Starmer and others were “on the wrong side” of justice, humanity and history. Starmer has not responded. Before he does, he should at least check the history.

Immediately after Hamas’s barbaric October 7, 2023, invasion, Netanyahu declared that Israel would seek Hamas’s political and military destruction. This was an entirely legitimate exercise of UN Charter Article 51, which affirms “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.”

Jerusalem was not limited to a “proportional” response, something comparable to the Hamas terrorist attack, any more than America was limited to a “proportional” response to Pearl Harbor. States are entitled not merely to repel threats, but to destroy them, as the allies did to Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.

Moreover, clear from the outset and becoming clearer by the day as new information emerges, Hamas’s attack was part of Iran’s “ring of fire strategy” against Israel, a strategy implemented by the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Just to remind, “Quds” is an Arabic term for Jerusalem, celebrated on Ramadan’s last day by Palestinians as “Quds Day.” Implementing its “ring” strategy, Tehran created or fostered a chain of terrorist groups: Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Shia militias in Iraq. Bashar al-Assad’s Syria was a key ally.

The anti-Israel strategy unfolded across the Middle East immediately after October 7. From the beginning, Israel saw Gaza as part of a wider war, not merely a discrete conflict. Now far more evident than at the outset, however, is the war’s economic dimension, a critical factor long before October 7.

Iran and other regional states, groups and individuals provided billions of dollars, directly and through international agencies like UNRWA, ostensibly for humanitarian aid. Tragically, however, as we now know, Hamas diverted much of these “humanitarian” resources to build Gaza’s underground fortress of tunnel networks; armed itself to the hilt (including with missile arsenals capable of menacing all Israel); and effectively mobilised most Gazans to serve as human shields for that fortress. If Hamas kept adequate records that can be recovered, the story will embarrass those who enabled this massive fraud, particularly in the West.

Meanwhile, Jerusalem is pursuing its post-October 7 goals, which must include eliminating all potential assets, in cash or in kind, Hamas can use to retain control over Gaza’s population. Working through UNRWA over decades, Hamas seized control over the distribution of virtually all humanitarian supplies entering Gaza. Credible reports (and Hamas records, if recovered) demonstrate how the terrorists rewarded their cadres at the expense of others, using control over the internal distribution of supplies in Gaza to cement their political control.

This pattern is nothing new. After the first Gulf War, Saddam Hussein used the UN’s “Oil for Food” programme to gain control over Iraq’s population. As originally conceived, an intrusive UN presence would use Iraq’s oil revenues for humanitarian aid to its people, thus ensuring the non-political delivery of assistance to the truly needy, while also demonstrating to Iraqis that Saddam had effectively lost control of his country. He repeatedly rejected this model, until the Clinton administration conceded that his regime would disburse Oil-for-Food aid. That mistake helped Saddam reinforce his authoritarian grip, repress Kurds and other dissidents, and again threaten his neighbours,

Hamas has thus simply been following Saddam’s plan. Israel, by contrast, has followed principles Herbert Hoover first articulated in World War I when he organised relief programs in Europe, starting in Belgium. Hoover ordered that no aid would go to combatants, and that his volunteers would distribute the aid, or at least rigorously monitor delivery to prevent diversion to combatants.

Hamas scorned Hoover’s principles, and continues to do so. Comments by Starmer, Lammy and others ignore both the reality in Gaza today and Hoover’s wise admonitions about ensuring that relief goes to those who actually need it, not those who use the aid to oppress them.

Israel has a plan to aid Gazans, backed by Washington but opposed by the UN. Instead of criticising Israel, Starmer should support and help perfect Jerusalem’s plan and thereby properly deliver humanitarian assistance.

The only way Gazans can ever be free is to eliminate the curse of Hamas. And because Gaza is part of Iran’s larger war against Israel and the West, that will happen only when Iranians are free of the ayatollahs. That should be our common goal.

This article was first published in The Daily Telegraph on May 26, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Putin certainly sees Trump as an easy mark

April 29, 2025

Judging a US president’s first hundred days began with Franklin Roosevelt. For Donald Trump, however, certainly on national-security issues, comparison to Napoleon’s hundred-days campaign may be more apt, ending as it did in disaster for both the emperor and France.

Trump’s indifference to Ukraine and his conciliatory approach toward Russia are only one of several shocks to trans-Atlantic relations. Disdain for NATO and the ever-present specter of US withdrawal, or even substantial disengagement, like renouncing the supreme European command, are also dangerous. Combined with Trump’s chaotic, incoherent, economically illiterate trade decisions, there is reason to despair.

The good news, such as it is: Trump is not pursuing a grand strategy, or even “policy” as we normally understand that word. He sees everything transactionally, through the prism of personal ties, and how he benefits from them, politically or economically. If he and Vladimir Putin have good rapport, he believes America and Russia have good state-to-state relations. This is not unique to Putin. Trump said about North Korea’s Kim Jung Un: “We fell in love.”

Putin certainly sees Trump as an easy mark, not a friend, manipulating him on Ukraine, for example, by agreeing that Trump was correct to say that the Ukraine war would not have happened had he been president. Putin then released a US hostage, followed by Belarus also doing so, always a winner with Trump. Moscow has just recently exchanged yet another US citizen, even as Russia has been slow-rolling cease-fire negotiations. This is not about a Trump strategy, but about his susceptibility to flattery and exploitation.

Trump is an aberration in American politics, someone entirely absorbed with himself. That he has been elected twice says more about his opponents’ weaknesses than voter devotion to Trump personally, or his actions as president. His public support is dropping and will drop significantly more if his newly launched trade wars cause an economic downtown. Republicans in Congress are finally beginning to distance themselves from Trump and will steer further away as the 2026 elections approach. Democrats, by contrast, still have not regained a pulse since last November’s election.

The answer is not to panic or do things that give Trump further excuses to quit Europe. During the Cold War, Soviet leaders sought to split the Atlantic alliance. Their failure to do so contributed significantly to Moscow’s defeat. This is not the time for us to do to ourselves what the Kremlin could not.

This article was first published in Atlantik-Bruecke on April 29, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

The Only Question Trump Asks Himself

March 11, 2025

Ukraine’s Volodomyr Zelensky is “a dictator without elections,” with only a four percent
approval rating( https://www.newsweek.com/what-trump-has-said-about-zelensky-since-2022-
2039000 ). The war in Ukraine( https://apnews.com/article/trump-speech-congress-transcript-
751b5891a3265ff1e5c1409c391fef7c ) is “madness” and “senseless.” While it is true Russia is
currently “pounding” Ukraine, “probably anyone in that position would be doing that right
now( https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crknjxj3n4zo ).” Kyiv is “more difficult, frankly, to deal
with” than Moscow.
This Russian propaganda could be easily dismissed, were it not being verbalized by
Donald Trump. He has turned US policy on the Russo-Ukraine war 180 degrees. Instead of
aiding a victimized country with enormous agricultural, mineral, and industrial resources in the
heart of Europe, bordering on key NATO allies, a region whose stability and prosperity have
been vital to American national security for eight decades, we now sides with the invader.
Ukrainians are fighting and dying for their freedom and independence, as near neighbors like
Lech Walesa fully appreciate(( https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/03/polish-ex-
president-lech-walesa-expresses-orror-and-distaste-at-donald-trump-volodymyr-zelenskyy-jd-
vance-spat?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email ). For most Americans, “freedom” and
“independence” resonate, but not for Trump.
He has gone well beyond rhetoric. In an unprecedented nationally televised display, he
clashed with Zelensky face-to-face in the Oval Office, ironically a very Wilsonian act: open
covenants openly destroyed. Trump suspended US military aid to Ukraine, including vital
intelligence, to make the obdurate Zelensky bend his knee. Even when Trump “threatened”
Russia with sanctions and tariffs, the threat was hollow. Russia is already evading a broad array
of poorly enforced sanctions, and could evade more. On tariffs, US imports from Russia in 2024
were a mere $3 billion( https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4621.html ), down ninety
percent from 2021’s level, before Russia’s invasion, and trivial compared to $4.1 trillion in total
2024 imports( https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/05/business/economy/us-trade-deficit-2024-
record.html ).
The Kremlin is delighted. Former President Dmitri Medvedev wrote on X: “If you’d
told me just three months ago that these were the words of the US president, I would have
laughed out loud( https://tass.com/politics/1916157) .” Unfortunately, none of this is new for
Trump. His view on Putin has remained constant for years. Saying recently that dealing with
Putin was easier than with Zelensky and that Putin would be “more generous than he has to
be( https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/mar/07/trump-says-it-is-easier-to-deal-with-
russia-and-putin-wants-to-end-the-war )” simply reprises Trump’s first term. Leaving the White
House in July, 2018, for a NATO summit (where he almost withdrew America from the
alliance), and later meetings with Prime Minister Theresa May in England and Putin in Finland
(where he seemed to back Putin over US intelligence), Trump said meeting Putin “may be the
easiest of them all. Who would think( https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/10politics/trump-putin-
meeting/index.html )?” Obviously, only Trump.
This is serious, and may be fatal both for Kyiv and NATO. Trump has sought for years
to debilitate or destroy the alliance. He doesn’t like it; he doesn’t understand it; he frowns on
its Brussels headquarters building; and, worst of all, it was deeply involved not only in Ukraine,
but Afghanistan, which he didn’t like either. Trump wants to withdraw from NATO, but, near
term, he can do serious-enough damage simply to render the alliance unworkable. Recent
reports that Trump is considering defending only those NATO allies meeting the agreed defense-
spending targets( https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/trump-considering-major-
nato-policy-shift-rcna195089 ) mirrors prior suggestions from his aides. This approach is not
merely unworkable, but devastating for the alliance( https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-should-
lay-off-nato-target-the-u-n-7e02e960 ).
What explains Trump’s about-face on Ukraine and disdain for NATO? Many find it
impossible to grasp how aberrational Trump is: he does not have a philosophy or a national-
security grand strategy. He does not do “policy” as Washington understands that term. His
approach is personal, transactional, ad hoc, episodic, centering on one question: what benefits
Donald Trump? In international affairs, Trump has said repeatedly that if he has good personal
relations with a foreign head of state, then America has good relations with that country. While
personal relations have their place, the hard men like Putin, Xi Jinping, and Kim Jung Un are not
distracted by emotions. Trump thinks Putin is his friend. Putin sees Trump as an easy mark,
pliable and manipulable, demonstrated by his approach post-November 5.
Trump says he trusts that Putin wants peace and will honor his commitments, despite
massive contrary evidence. Notwithstanding considerable efforts. Zelensky has never escaped
the “perfect” phone call precipitating Trump’s first impeachment. Of course, that call turned on
Trump’s now-familiar extortionist threat to withhold security assistance to Ukraine if Zelensky
did not produce Hilary Clinton’s server and investigate other supposed anti-Trump activity in
Ukraine aimed at thwarting his 2016 and 2020 presidential campaigns. The entirely personal
nature of Trump’s approach also manifests itself domestically. Trump is now reversing what
Biden did in Ukraine, just as, in his first term, he reflexively reversed Obama. Trump derided
Obama for not providing lethal military assistance to Ukraine, so he did just that, sending
Tomahawk cruise missiles and more.
Ronald Reagan knew what to do about nations that might commit unprovoked aggression
against US interests. Trump clearly does not. This does not reflect differences in strategy,
which Trump lacks. Instead, it’s another Trump reversal, this time of The Godfather’s famous
line, “it’s not business, it’s strictly personal.”

This article was first published in The Atlantic on March 11, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

How to Protect NATO and Other Alliances From Trump

March 04, 2025

Responsible advisers and GOP lawmakers should redirect his focus to other targets, especially the EU.

Last week’s Trump-Vance-Zelensky train wreck proved that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is on increasingly shaky ground. Starting with Donald Trump’s Feb. 12 phone call with Vladimir Putin about the Ukraine war, things got worse when Mr. Trump called Volodymyr Zelensky a “dictator” and the war’s instigator. Vice President JD Vance’s neocon-like complaints that Western Europeans were insufficiently democratic, without comparable analysis of Russia, eased Mr. Putin away from diplomatic purdah. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s plan to consider massive cuts in defense spending foreshadows even worse consequences. The Oval Office grudge match finished the picture, and all now points to trashing history’s most successful politico-military alliance. Mr. Trump hasn’t formally withdrawn from NATO, but he is so gravely weakening it that leaving would simply be the final insult.

NATO isn’t America’s only alliance in jeopardy. In his first term, Mr. Trump’s assault on NATO arrived alongside his criticism of other allies, albeit not as publicly as today. The Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network, the Australia-U.K.-U.S. consortium to build nuclear-powered submarines for Australia, and the export-control rules designed to keep rogue states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction—are all at risk. Even bilateral ties with Japan and South Korea are in question. Taiwan should be very worried.

Israel may escape for now, but Israelis should recall Martin Niemöller’s poem, which concludes: “Then they came for me—and there was no one left to speak for me.”

Two complementary political counterattacks are needed—to save Ukraine from Russia and to salvage NATO. Although the evidence is tenuous, there may still be enough alliance supporters among Mr. Trump’s advisers to change course. If so, they must advise the president on what he should be doing, not just responding “yes, sir” to his ill-informed statements.

I’ve been through this myself, as have others, and can attest it will be unpleasant for those showing loyalty to our country and its Constitution. But at some point, principles must rise above job security and ambition. Resignation becomes the only honorable course. Each adviser will have to make his own decision. But they need to start making them.

House and Senate Republicans must also stand up against dismantling our alliances and gutting the defense budget. Some lawmakers are asserting themselves on Ukraine and NATO, and more must follow. They will find allies among Democrats, and together they could constitute majorities in both chambers. Vocal congressional support for bolstering our alliances and substantially increasing defense spending is important in its own right—and for the reassurance it will give like-minded Trump administration officials. There is no argument more powerful to Mr. Trump than his own political well-being.

Alliance supporters should also persuade Mr. Trump to focus on his well-known disdain for the European Union, thereby easing the assault on NATO. Mr. Trump’s distaste for the EU reflects European weakness and inadequate defense spending, as well as his criticism of trade terms negotiated by previous U.S. administrations. Some of that dissatisfaction is justified but not enough to dismantle broader American security interests.

Here, Europeans must reject EU dogmatism, especially espoused by France, which insisted, even before the EU’s creation, on Europe’s separateness from America. Long reflected in calls for a “European pillar” within NATO, this groupthink has corroded the alliance’s cohesion. Ironically, and potentially fatally, if France’s EU ideology prevails and the EU tries to substitute itself for NATO, that would provide support for Mr. Trump’s view that America should withdraw. Not all of Europe suffers from this kind of thinking. Much of Donald Rumsfeld’s “new Europe” in the east and some “old Europeans,” like the U.K. and Nordic NATO members, have always emphasized Atlanticism. It is “old Europeans” such as France and Germany that are the main problem.

Europe’s first reaction to Mr. Trump’s fusillade, predictably led by French President Emmanuel Macron, was to assume Washington was irretrievably departing. Instead, to protect the West’s overall security and shared concerns about rising global threats, NATO advocates on both sides of the Atlantic must resist the misimpression that Mr. Trump’s position is enduring. Whether Europeans can stand alone against the China-Russia axis, the real overarching menace, is doubtful. Europeans should prize being part of the West more highly than being part of the EU, and act on that basis. Unfortunately, incoming German Chancellor Friedrich Merz moved immediately in the wrong direction, saying he would seek “independence” from the U.S. Saying that “the free world needs a new leader,” as EU official Kaja Kallas did, also doesn’t help.

Mr. Trump never appreciated Winston Churchill’s insight that “there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” Accordingly, advancing U.S. national-security interests under Mr. Trump, and saving our admittedly imperfect alliances, requires enduring before prevailing. One answer is to outlast him, distract him and find him other targets. But the most important course is to tell the truth to the American people, starting now.

This article was first published in the Wall Street Journal on March 3, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

After the Oval Office Debacle

March 03, 2025

Vladimir Putin was the only winner in last week’s Oval Office grudge match between Donald Trump and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky. Trump harmed US national security by ignoring our profound, long-standing interest in European stability, which we learned through the 20th Century’s two hot world wars and one Cold War. Ensuring our enemies do not control the European landmass, and having extensive trans-Atlantic economic, political, cultural and familial relations are palpably important to our way of life. All this is at risk. Trump has not merely gone neutral in the Russo-Ukraine war, he is objectively on Moscow’s side.

Likely now to be abandoned by Washington, its largest single source of military and economic aid, Kyiv’s problems are even worse. Ukraine still faces the implacable Russian enemy, whose leadership is determined to recreate the Czars’ empire, especially by absorbing “little Russia” as they patronizingly call it. The Europeans, for all their bluster, are woefully inadequate substitutes, especially if Washington moves even further into Russia’s camp, perhaps lifting economic sanctions and seeking investments in Russian mineral resources.

The instant analysis of Friday’s debacle, pitting Trump supporters against Zelensky supporters, largely turned on questions of etiquette. This is seriously wrong. What is at stake is not an Emily Post-style assessment of who blew up the meeting, who was rude or disrespectful, or judging “where the meeting went wrong.” Almost certainly, everything the three principals said with the press watching, they would have said while meeting privately after the Oval Office photo opportunity. The issue is US national security, not whose behavior was more juvenile.

Trump argued that Zelensky was not serious about peace, and that his comments made it harder to persuade Putin to come to the negotiating table. But Putin is hardly a snowflake, wounded by unkind Zelensky remarks. In fact, Putin is one of the most cold-blooded leaders in today’s world. He knows exactly what he wants. Even though his logic, especially regarding the value of human life, does not correspond to ours, he has relentlessly pursued his objective of restoring “greater Russia.” Ukrainians object to this outcome not because they have bad manners but because they insist on freedom and independence (should be familiar words for Americans) from foreign oppressors.

Indeed, it is precisely Washington’s massive shift toward Moscow that moving legitimate discussions between Kyiv and Moscow into the future. As Trump hands the Kremlin one concession after another, Russia’s incentive to negotiate diminishes. Why seek compromise through negotiations when obtaining precisely what they want by direct US intervention?

Former Russian President Dmitri Medvedev wrote prior to the Oval Office disaster, “if you’d told me just three months ago that these were the words of the U.S. president, I would have laughed out loud(https://nypost.com/2025/02/20/world-news/russia-praises-trump-after-he-ripped-ukraines-zelensky/).” He was referring not just to Trump calling Zelensky a “dictator” but to abandoning US and NATO positions that Ukraine must reobtain full sovereignty and territorial integrity; that Ukraine could ultimately join NATO; and that America or NATO itself would give Kyiv security guarantees under a comprehensive peace deal. Such retreats clearly evidence that Trump is now siding with Moscow rather than Kyiv and America’s own security.

Trump’s insistence that he wants “peace,” while carefully phrased for its political benefits, is in fact the most dangerous outcome of the Oval Office meeting. Peace can always be obtained by surrender. “Peace at any price” is always on offer. Russia’s unprovoked aggression put Ukraine at risk, not its desire to join NATO. That has been America’s official position since at least 2008 under George W. Bush. Russia did not strike against Ukraine until 2014, and then waited eight years to attack again in 2022. By adopting the Kremlin’s view that Ukraine and NATO precipitated the war, Trump is repeating Russian propaganda. Former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson called this notion “Orwellian”: “you might as well say that the swimmers were responsible for attacking the shark in Jaws or the United States were responsible for attacking Japan at Pearl Harbor( https://www.lbc.co.uk/politics/uk-politics/boris-johnson-on-trumps-ukraine-comments/).”

Whether Ukraine and America can find a way back from the precipice remains to be seen. The real threat for the United States, however, is that we now have a President who can’t tell our friends from our enemies.

This article was first published in the Washington Examiner on March 3, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Dark days lie ahead with Trump on the world stage once more

November 30, 2024

Soon to be cast adrift by President-elect Trump, Ukraine’s likely future is bleak. Let’s not make it worse by a feckless peace deal
Donald Trump’s looming inauguration bodes poorly for vital Western security interests, and Ukraine in particular. Trump’s hostility to NATO is palpable, and his feelings about Ukraine follow close behind. After January 20, US military and economic assistance will likely drop significantly, and negotiations with Russia begin quickly. In turn, European financial support for Ukraine will diminish, as EU members rush to revive now-defunct commercial ties with Moscow. Despite contrary press reports, Trump has not yet spoken to Vladimir Putin. When they do, Trump’s desire to put this “Biden war” behind him could, at worst, mean capitulation to maximalist Russian demands. After all, if assisting Ukraine’s defence against unprovoked aggression is unimportant to Washington, why worry about Kyiv’s terms of surrender?

In fact, core America national interests remain. Since 1945, European peace and stability have been vital to advancing US economic and political security. The ripple effects of perceived American and NATO failure in Europe’s centre will embolden Beijing to act aggressively toward Taiwan and the East China Sea; the South China Sea; and along its land borders. These aren’t abstract, diaphanous worries at the periphery of our interests, but hard threats to US physical security, trade, travel and communications globally.

Biden put these interests at risk by bungling implementation of nearly three years of aid to Kyiv. He never developed a winning strategy. His administration helped create the current battlefield gridlock, deterred by constant but idle Kremlin threats of a “wider war.” Parcelling out weapons only after long public debates prevented their most effective use. Biden failed to explain clearly Russia’s threat to key Western interests, thereby fanning the belief there are no such interests, and abetting the Trump-inspired isolationism spreading nationally.

What to do? Aiding Ukraine is in NATO’s vital interest. That interest does not diminish because of persistent Biden administration poor performance. Do we ignore the continuing reality that Russia’s aggression threatens Alliance security? Does Ukraine simply give way to Trumpian capitulationism?

Certainly not. In the coming negotiations, certain points are essential to any potential agreement. The following suggestions, which are hardly my preferred outcome, are the absolute minimum we must obtain. They are only indicative, not exhaustive, and certainly not NATO’s opening position.

Any agreement must be explicitly provisional to keep Ukraine’s future open. Moscow will treat any deal that way regardless. For the Kremlin, nothing is permanent until its empire is fully restored, by their lights. Putin needs time to restore Russia’s military capabilities, and believing any “commitment” to forswear future aggression against Ukraine is dreaming.

A ceasefire along existing military frontlines during negotiations may be inevitable. Nonetheless, we should insist that any ultimate agreement explicitly state that the lines eventually drawn have no political import whatever, but merely reflect existing military dispositions. Russia may later disregard such disclaimers, but such claims must be rendered clearly invalid in advance.

Similarly, the agreement should not create demilitarised zones between Ukrainian and Russian forces inside Ukraine, or along the two countries’ formal border elsewhere. The surest way for a ceasefire line to become a permanent border is to make it half-a-mile wide, extending endlessly through contested territory. A DMZ inures solely to Moscow’s benefit.

Deployments of UN peacekeepers have an unhappy history of freezing the status quo, not helping to resolve the underlying conflict. Consider the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which has partitioned the island since 1964. The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has patrolled the Golan Heights since 1974, and may last forever, but did not prevent Israel from annexing the Golan. The list goes on. In Ukraine, a disengagement force could mean permanent cession of twenty percent of Ukraine to Russia.

The problem is not mitigated if the peacekeepers are under NATO rather than UN auspices. It is not the quality of the military that makes a difference, but the intentions of the parties to the conflict. Does anyone doubt what Russia’s long-term aims are? Or Ukraine’s for that matter? My guess is that the Kremlin won’t agree to NATO peacekeepers anyway, at least not unless augmented by thousands of North Korean troops.

Finally, Ukraine should not be constrained in its future options to join or cooperate with NATO. What’s left of Ukraine will still be a sovereign country, striving for representative government, and free to pick its allies on its own. We should not acquiesce in enforced neutralisation, what in the Cold War was called “Finlandisation”. Even Finland turned out not to like it, finally joining NATO in 2023. And if some hardy nations want to provide security guarantees to Free Ukraine, they should be able to do so, not subject to Russian vetoes.

Soon to be cast adrift by President-elect Trump, Ukraine’s likely future is bleak. Let’s not make it worse by a feckless peace deal.

This article was first published in The Telegraph on November 30, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

Trump Is a Danger to U.S. Security

January 31, 2024

His isolationist views and erratic thinking and style would post even greater risks in a second term.

When I became President Trump’s national security adviser in 2018, I assumed the gravity of his responsibilities would discipline even him. I was wrong. His erratic approach to governance and his dangerous ideas gravely threaten American security. Republican primary voters should take note.

Mr. Trump’s only consistent focus is on himself. He invariably equated good personal relations with foreign leaders to good relations between countries. Personal relations are important, but the notion that they sway Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and their ilk is perilously wrong.

Mr. Trump’s most dangerous legacy is the spread of the isolationist virus in the Republican Party. The Democrats long ago adopted an incoherent melding of isolationism with indiscriminate multilateralism. If isolationism becomes the dominant view among Republicans, America is in deep trouble.

The most immediate crisis involves Ukraine. Barack Obama’s limp-wristed response to Moscow’s 2014 aggression contributed substantially to Mr. Putin’s 2022 attack. But Mr. Trump’s conduct was also a factor. He accused Ukraine of colluding with Democrats against him in 2016 and demanded answers. No answers were forthcoming, since none existed. President Biden’s aid to Ukraine has been piecemeal and nonstrategic, but it is almost inevitable that a second-term Trump policy on Ukraine would favor Moscow.

Mr. Trump’s assertions that he was “tougher” on Russia than earlier presidents are inaccurate. His administration imposed major sanctions, but they were urged by advisers and carried out only after he protested vigorously. His assertions that Mr. Putin would never have invaded Ukraine had he been re-elected are wishful thinking. Mr. Putin’s flattery pleases Mr. Trump. When Mr. Putin welcomed Mr. Trump’s talk last year of ending the Ukraine war, Mr. Trump gushed: “I like that he said that. Because that means what I’m saying is right.” Mr. Putin knows his mark and would relish a second Trump term.

An even greater danger is that Mr. Trump will act on his desire to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He came precariously close in 2018. The Supreme Court has never ruled authoritatively whether the president can abrogate Senate-ratified treaties, but presidents have regularly done so. Recently enacted legislation to stop Mr. Trump from withdrawing without congressional consent likely wouldn’t survive a court challenge. It could precipitate a constitutional crisis and years of litigation.

Mr. Trump is unlikely to thwart the Beijing-Moscow axis. While he did draw attention to China’s growing threat, his limited conceptual reach led to simple-minded formulas (trade surpluses good, deficits bad). His tough talk allowed others to emphasize greater Chinese misdeeds, including massive theft of Western intellectual property, mercantilist trade policies, manipulation of the World Trade Organization, and “debt diplomacy,” which puts unwary countries in hock to Beijing. These are all real threats, but whether Mr. Trump is capable of countering them is highly doubtful.

Ultimately, Beijing’s obduracy and Mr. Trump’s impulse for personal publicity precluded whatever slim chances existed to eliminate China’s economic abuses. In a second term, Mr. Trump would likely continue seeking “the deal of the century” with China, while his protectionism, in addition to being bad economic policy, would make it harder to stand up to Beijing. The trade fights he picked with Japan, Europe and others impaired our ability to increase pressure against China’s broader transgressions.

The near-term risks of China manufacturing a crisis over Taiwan would rise dramatically. Mr. Xi is watching Ukraine and may be emboldened by Western failure there. A physical invasion is unlikely, but China’s navy could blockade the island and perhaps seize Taiwanese islands near the mainland. The loss of Taiwan’s independence, which would soon follow a U.S. failure to resist Beijing’s blockade, could persuade countries near China to appease Beijing by declaring neutrality.

Taiwan’s fall would encourage Beijing to finalize its asserted annexation of almost all the South China Sea. Littoral states like Vietnam and the Philippines would cease resistance. Commerce with Japan and South Korea, especially of Middle Eastern oil, would be subjected to Chinese control, and Beijing would have nearly unfettered access to the Indian Ocean, endangering India.

And imagine Mr. Trump’s euphoria at resuming contact with North Korea’s Kim Jung Un, about whom he famously boasted that “we fell in love.” Mr. Trump almost gave away the store to Pyongyang, and he could try again. A reckless nuclear deal would alienate Japan and South Korea, extend China’s influence, and strengthen the Beijing-Moscow axis.

Israel’s security might seem an issue on which Mr. Trump’s first-term decisions and rhetoric should comfort even his opponents. But he has harshly criticized Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu since the Oct. 7 attacks, and there is no foreign-policy area in which the absence of electoral constraints could liberate Mr. Trump as much as in the Middle East. There is even a danger of a new deal with Tehran. Mr. Trump almost succumbed to French President Emmanuel Macron’s pleading to meet Iran’s foreign minister in August 2019.

Mr. Trump negotiated the catastrophic withdrawal deal with the Taliban, which Mr. Biden further bungled. The overlap between Messrs. Trump’s and Biden’s views on Afghanistan demonstrate the absence of any Trump national-security philosophy. Even in the Western Hemisphere, Mr. Trump didn’t carry through on reversing Obama administration policies on Cuba and Venezuela. His affinity for strongmen may lead to deals with Nicolás Maduro and whatever apparatchik rules in Havana.

Given Mr. Trump’s isolationism and disconnected thinking, there is every reason to doubt his support for the defense buildup we urgently need. He initially believed he could cut defense spending simply because his skills as a negotiator could reduce procurement costs. Even as he increased defense budgets, he showed acute discomfort, largely under the influence of isolationist lawmakers. He once tweeted that his own military budget was “crazy” and that he, Mr. Putin and Mr. Xi should confer to prevent a new arms race. Mr. Trump is no friend of the military. In private, he was confounded that anyone would put himself in danger by joining.

A second Trump term would bring erratic policy and uncertain leadership, which the China-Russia axis would be only too eager to exploit.

This article was first published in The Wall Street Journal on January 31, 2024. Click here to read the original article.