As Donald Trump’s tariffs begin to bite more widely, considerable amounts of hard data on their actual consequences will soon arrive. Of course, the rationale for many of Trump’s tariffs remains opaque, and, despite the August 1 “deadline,” negotiations continue with several important trading partners.
The tariffs’ economic impact continues to emerge, but their international diplomatic and political effects remain hard to measure. From a geopolitical perspective, it is entirely logical to ask how tariffs fit into America’s grand strategy, although the Trump administration has not done so. Unfortunately, based on international reactions so far, the United States, by tariffing friend and foe alike, has likely suffered a considerable loss of trust and confidence, built up over decades of effort, in exchange for minimal economic gains, if any, and risk of formidable losses.
The central, still-unresolved issue is China, in recent years always among America’s top three trading partners (with Canada and Mexico), and especially how China fares compared to India. The White House seems headed toward more-lenient treatment for Beijing on tariff rates and other metrics than it imposed on New Delhi. If so, it will be a potentially enormous mistake. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent(https://apnews.com/article/us-china-trade-stockholm-tariffs-bessent-lifeng-2cffb7de31169afc8de0c02bedb4683a) has suggested that China’s August 12 deadline could be extended if negotiations looked promising.
Trump announced on July 30 that India’s tariff rate would be 26%, one percent lower than originally proposed on April 2(https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/trump-hits-india-25-tariff-rcna221907), but a major increase from the previous average rate of 2.4%. Moreover, Trump harshly criticized India’s acquisition of Russian military equipment, underlining a longstanding US-India disagreement, and Indian purchases of Russian oil and gas in violation of America’s Ukraine-related sanctions. (India is also one of the “BRICS” countries, which Trump separately singled out for a 10% tariff.) Indians were surprised and angered by the relative harshness of India’s treatment(https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-31/trump-blasts-india-over-russia-ties-pushing-modi-into-a-corner), and the threat of additional, unspecified penalties if Washington and New Delhi could not quickly strike a deal.
That anger could grow exponentially if China snagged a better agreement, especially if Trump is seen as sacrificing US strategic interests(https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/07/29/us-china-trade-war-talks-trump-xi-summit-partnership-cooperation/) in his “zeal for a deal” with Xi Jinping. China has a significantly higher trade deficit with the US than does India, and Washington has long complained about Chinese trade practices. These include stealing intellectual property, unfairly subsidizing their international companies, and denying access to China’s domestic market, contrary to repeated commitments.
Geopolitically, China (and its emerging Russia axis) is this century’s principle strategic threat to America and its allies. Many analysts believe Trump could offer significant concessions on key security issues, such as Taiwan, to get a China deal, citing the recent reversal of the long-standing practice(https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/30/world/asia/trump-taiwan-china.html) of allowing Taiwan’s president to make transit stops in America and not reaching a trade deal with Taipei(https://www.ft.com/content/3c48233d-dca6-4cd6-8ba9-c86fcfa853b0) before August 1. Graham Allison says “Trump’s view of Taiwan is more compatible with China’s than any U.S. president since World War II(https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/07/29/us-china-trade-war-talks-trump-xi-summit-partnership-cooperation/).” Further examples of Trump’s softness include allowing Nvidia(https://www.ft.com/content/ba0929bd-5912-44fb-9048-c143aced4c8a) to resume exports of sensitive information technology to China; and ignoring US statutory requirements(https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/us-attorney-general-cited-this-justification-for-trumps-power-to-ignore-tiktok-ban) to ban TikTok or divest Chinese ownership.
Critical for Washington is Beijing’s strengthening axis with Moscow. This “partnership without limits” as Xi and Vladimir Putin have described it, has already resulted in significantly increased Chinese purchases of hydrocarbons, and negotiations to build new oil and gas pipelines between the two, plus increased financial and military cooperation. This axis raises risks all along their peripheries, from Asia through the Middle East to Europe. Beijing’s hegemonic, threatening behavior against Taiwan and the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands, and against competing territorial claimants in the South China Sea, endanger key US allies and trading partners. China and India themselves face off across a long, much-disputed border. Moreover, China aids Pakistan, India’s intense rival, including militarily as demonstrated in the recent Pahalgam crisis. To make matters worse, Indians have noted that both Pakistan and Bangladesh scored lower tariff rates from Trump(https://indianexpress.com/article/business/us-tariffs-india-pakistan-bangladesh-50-countries-trump-market-10163029/).
Having China emerge better than India in their respective trade relations with America is entirely counterproductive. Instead of advancing cooperation within the Asian Security Quad (India, Japan, Australia and America), Trump could well push India into closer economic and political ties(https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/07/28/india-china-normalization-trump-second-term-geopolitics/) with Russia and China. Beijing would see Trump’s trade concessions as expressions of fundamental American weakness and dependence on trade with Beijing. At least Secretary Bessent did make clear(https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/bessent-warns-china-russian-oil-purchases-that-could-bring-100-tariffs-2025-07-29/) after the last round of US-China talks that China also risked heavy tariffs due to its purchases of Russian (and Iranian) oil and gas.
This reality, and Beijing’s intransigence on trade issues, could stem Trump’s lust for an agreement with Xi, but the outcome is uncertain. If the tariffs’ negative effects unfold as economics theory indicates, Trump’s domestic political support will weaken correspondingly. Giving China a sweetheart deal on trade will only worsen his problems. We may be saved, therefore, by Trump’s highest priority: his own well-being.
This article was originally published by The Hill, on August 6, 2025. Click here to read the original article.